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Would preferential access measures be sufficient 
to overcome current barriers to CDM projects in 
Least Developed Countries? 
 
Abstract: Financial support for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in 
underrepresented host countries was agreed on at the Copenhagen conference. The EU rules 
include special import quotas for Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs). This paper discusses whether these measures can contribute to 
overcoming barriers to CDM development in LDCs, how Programmes of Activities (PoAs) are 
performing, and how CDM projects and PoAs contribute to sustainable development in LDCs. 
CER supply and demand scenarios for 2013-2020 show that preferential access measures for 
LDCs would not have an important impact on CDM in these countries if the barriers for 
project implementation are not overcome. The specific CDM projects and PoAs found in LDCs 
yield potentially high sustainable development benefits. Through a comparison between the 
climate regime and the Lomé Convention, a preferential access agreement in agricultural 
trade, we conclude that not just preferential access is important, but also reduced access 
costs and the removal of underlying barriers. Increased incentives for added-value products 
characterise the Lomé success stories. For the climate regime, this could be translated into 
additional financial incentives for CDM projects with added value. As LDCs host a high share 
of them, PoAs could constitute an opportunity here. 
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Through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), greenhouse gas emission reduction 
credits from projects in developing countries can be acquired by industrialised countries to 
comply with their Kyoto Protocol emission reduction targets. By October 2010 (UNEP Risoe 
Centre, 2010), the CDM had mobilised over 5500 projects, out of which 2400 had been 
registered with the CDM Executive Board (EB) and have the potential to generate Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs). About 2.8 billion CERs are expected from these projects by 
2012.  
The CDM project portfolio is very unevenly distributed across host countries. China, India and 
Brazil account for about 72% of projects and 76% of expected CERs. Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) host just 61 CDM projects in the pipeline (1.1%), of which only 19 projects 
are registered.  
This uneven distribution of the CDM has been repeatedly criticised, as it directly affects both 
countries’ expectations of receiving CDM-related financial flows, and the realisation of the 
second goal of this mechanism, which is to contribute to sustainable development (SD) in its 
host countries. Already in 2001, the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) called for the EB to report “to the COP/MOP on the 
regional and subregional distribution of CDM project activities with a view to identifying 
systematic or systemic barriers to their equitable distribution” (UNFCCC, 2001: 28). The 
COP/MOP (the Conference of the Parties acting as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol) confirmed this at its first meeting in 2005, asking the EB also to suggest options to 
address these barriers, and to broaden participation in the CDM (UNFCCC, 2005: 98). The 
Copenhagen conference in 2009 decided that simplified procedures for demonstrating the 
additionality of very small projects would be introduced, payment of registration fees would 
be postponed and upfront financing for CDM project validation and registration would be 
 4
provided for projects in hitherto underrepresented countries (UNFCCC, 2009). Analysts are 
also discussing other ways of differentiating countries in the CDM. Proposed means include: 
differentiated eligibility of CDM host countries, discounting of emission reduction credits from 
different host countries, introducing a cap to the amount of emission credits that can be 
issued from projects in each country, and a more directed allocation of demand towards 
particular host countries (Bakker et al., 2009; Castro and Michaelowa, 2010). Also, some 
buyers like the EU envisage special import quotas for CERs from LDCs or Small Island 
Developing States (SIDSs), as discussed in section 4.2.  
The issue of the sustainable development contribution of CDM projects has been widely 
discussed in the literature, through literature reviews (e.g. Olsen, 2007), case studies of 
individual projects (Borges da Cunha, 2007, Cole, 2007; Lenzen et al., 2007; Rudolph, 2007; 
Sirohi, 2007), systematic analyses of several CDM projects (Sutter and Parreño, 2007; Olsen 
and Fenhann, 2008), and attempts at creating objective tools to measure SD benefits (Sutter, 
2003; SouthSouthNorth, 2004; Olsen and Fenhann, 2008; Lenzen et al., 2007). As host 
countries’ expectations of generating financial flows and SD benefits depend on their 
attractiveness for CER buyers, this discussion remains relevant.  
The following questions thus arise: Could preferential access measures such as the ones 
described above really improve the participation of LDCs in the CDM? Could such improved 
participation generate sustainable development benefits in LDCs? Can new modalities of CDM 
projects, such as the Programmes of Activities (PoAs)1, which aim to target more distributed 
emission sources, provide a contribution? 
In this paper, we first discuss the current and potential supply of the CDM in LDCs, and 
present an overview of the barriers limiting CDM development in poor countries. In section 3, 
we describe the proposals in the international climate negotiations and in the EU climate and 
energy package to promote CER supply from LDCs and underrepresented CDM host 
countries. Section 4 develops possible CER supply and demand scenarios for the period 2013-
2020. For estimating the supply, we use an extrapolation of the figures provided by the UNEP 
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Risoe Center CDM Pipeline on the current CER supply, corrected for the project approval and 
credit issuance rates, and assuming different post-2012 regulatory scenarios. For the 
demand, we project the baseline emissions of developed countries until 2020 and assume a 
range of likely emission reduction targets and of supplementarity in the use of CDM credits. 
In section 5 we assess the impact of preferential access policies on CER supply from LDCs, 
and the potential sustainable development benefits from CDM projects and PoAs in LDCs. In 
section 6 we draw a comparison between a preferential access agreement in the agricultural 
trade system and the climate regime, before concluding in section 7.  
 
2. The CDM in LDCs 
2.1. Current and potential supply of CDM projects from LDCs 
In terms of volume of credits, LDCs are expected to generate just around 0.5% of all CERs 
projected by 2012. The foreseeable short-term CER supply from LDCs, including projects that 
are in the pipeline and project ideas mentioned in country-specific studies or CDM promotion 
websites (Chea, 2006; Uprety, 2006; Waste Concern, 2006; Yemen’s Ministry of Water and 
Environment, 2008), amounts to about 115 million CERs over the whole lifetime of the 
projects. This supply is dwarfed by the potential in China, India and other advanced 
developing countries, which reaches about 7 billion CERs by 2020.  
However, a recent World Bank study on the abatement potential in the energy sector in Sub-
Saharan Africa (De Gouvello et al., 2008) estimated a potential of about 4 billion CERs from 
Sub-Saharan LDCs over a project lifetime of 10-21 years. The study used the existing CDM 
methodologies to identify technologies that could both promote GHG emission reductions and 
support energy supply in the region. It made a bottom-up inventory of over 3200 potentially 
feasible clean energy projects applying 22 technologies in 44 countries in SSA. Comparing 
this theoretical potential with the real number of CDM projects from these countries gives an 
idea of the scale of the barriers for implementation the LDCs face. 
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There is a new CDM approach that could provide an inroad for small-scale, decentralised 
projects with potentially high SD benefits: the Programmes of Activities (PoAs). When in June 
2007 the CDM Executive Board agreed on rules for PoAs, it was hoped that they would 
significantly reduce transaction costs and mobilise the diffusion of small technologies, where 
the exact number and location of projects would not be known ex ante. However, for over 
two years, PoAs did not really move forward. The main reasons were regulatory barriers, 
such as the liability of the validator for any part of the PoA that might be found faulty even 
years after its registration, the limitation to one baseline methodology and the debundling 
rules for application of small-scale methodologies. The liability requirement in particular led 
validators to refuse to validate PoAs. After a long regulatory tug of war, the EB removed most 
of the barriers in May 2009. Moreover, validators now shift the liability to the PoA developer 
through a private law contract. Nevertheless, even after the May decision, PoAs only moved 
slowly – until December 2009, when submissions actually exploded. As of October 2010, 58 
PoAs have been submitted for validation, and 5 have been registered. 
The distribution of PoAs among host countries differs considerably from standard CDM 
projects. The large players are underrepresented, whereas countries that have set up good 
CDM institutions such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Vietnam and Yemen have PoAs. LDCs have 
a share of 12% of projects compared to about 1% in the normal CDM pipeline. 
 
2.2. Barriers 
What are the reasons for the marginal involvement of LDCs in the CDM? Mitigation potential, 
institutional CDM capacity and the general investment climate have been used as predictors 
of attractiveness of host countries for CDM projects, with the finding that about 74% of LDCs 
are very unattractive, 24% have limited attractiveness, and only 1% are attractive for non-
sink CDM projects (Jung, 2005). Furthermore, familiarity between investing country and host 
country (operationalised as past bilateral trade, bilateral aid and colonial relationship) was 
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found by Dolšak and Bowerman Crandall (2007) to be an even more important factor in 
explaining CDM location decisions. 
More specific barriers for CDM implementation in LDCs, especially in SSA, have been 
thoroughly discussed within the Nairobi Framework. This initiative was launched at 
COP/MOP2 in Nairobi (2006) with the aim of helping these countries to improve their level of 
participation in the CDM (see Muyungi (2006), Agyemang-Bonsu (2007), Ellis and Kamel 
(2007), Kinkead (2007), UNEP (2007), and the World Bank (2007)). 
One of the barriers most frequently mentioned is the limited institutional and technical 
capacity to develop and implement CDM projects. In the public sector, it is not only the DNAs 
that need to be established and have a minimum budget, but also the institutional framework 
for the sectors involved in the project (e.g. energy) is crucial. In the private sector, the 
presence of trained national CDM consultants is essential for coping with the complex CDM 
rules at affordable costs. The limited access to financing is an equally important barrier. On 
the one hand, domestic financial institutions lack capacity and awareness of the CDM as an 
investment option. On the other, the unattractive investment climate in these countries 
discourages foreign investors. Indeed, the CDM mainly functions as an additional revenue 
source for companies that already have financing. Annex I countries and companies are 
investing in CDM projects only in countries where they are already present (e.g. through 
subsidiary electricity companies), where they see a market for their products, and where 
stability is guaranteed (Lütken and Michaelowa, 2008). 
There are few possibilities to develop large CDM projects in LDCs, as the energy demand and 
industry are still small in these countries2. In Africa, the largest emission reduction potential 
lies in sectors that are not significant in the CDM at present (forestry, agriculture, reducing 
the use of non-renewable biomass), and the low grid emission factors make grid-connected 
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects less viable. However, while many observers 
assumed that small projects were not viable through the CDM due to the high transaction 
costs (Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005), nowadays there is a noteworthy amount of very small 
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CDM projects in the pipeline (see Figure 1) and Programmes of Activities are starting to take 
off, which suggests that the transaction-cost barrier can be overcome.  
Another important barrier is the availability of data for baselines and monitoring: gathering 
this information is too costly for just one or two projects, so nobody makes this effort. Finally, 
the lack of infrastructure (roads, large equipment but also laboratories for calibrating 
measurement devices) is another limiting factor for the CDM in LDCs. 
 
Figure 1 approximately here 
 
It is however possible to overcome these barriers, as the case of Honduras shows. Honduras 
is not a LDC, but a small and poor country, with an unstable political regime and unattractive 
investment climate. Corruption and crime are high, access to finance difficult. Despite 
substantial CDM capacity building and financial support for establishing a functional DNA, 
staff replacement after changes of government has led to losses in institutional capabilities. 
As most of its electricity is produced from fossil sources, Honduras has some mitigation 
potential from renewable energy. Additionally, Honduras was an early mover in the 
privatisation of the electricity sector in Central America, and financial incentives for renewable 
energy are in place. However, its electricity system is highly inefficient, and prices can only be 
sustained due to subsidies (Keller, 2008; Lokey, 2008; Figueres, 2002). Nevertheless, 
Honduras hosts 32 CDM projects, 16 of which are registered (UNEP Risoe Centre, 2010). 
Honduras has apparently benefited from the leadership of a strong group of entrepreneurs in 
the renewable sector, who initiated all the CDM projects and created an association that 
allowed them to pool and share their experience. There is also a local CDM consultancy and a 
couple of international ones with a presence in the country (Keller, 2008; Lokey, 2008). This 
domestic leadership, coupled with the early support from international donors, may be the 
key for the success of Honduras in the CDM.  
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3. Preferential access measures in the climate regime 
3.1. In the international climate negotiations 
As mentioned in the introduction, several measures to improve the regional distribution of 
CDM projects have been discussed in the international climate negotiations. However, the 
negotiations at COP 15 in Copenhagen proved a roller-coaster ride for LDC interests. The 
initial text proposed a subsidy for PDD development and validation in LDCs with less than 10 
registered projects. A second text version referred to “less developed” countries. But the final 
text did not limit it to any group of countries, so now even rich Middle Eastern oil-exporting 
countries qualify. Moreover, the initially foreseen grant mutated into a loan repaid upon the 
first issuance of CERs, and the total volume of the fund is capped at the interest accruing on 
the surplus of the EB, which will limit it to 1-2 million $ per year. On a positive note, the COP 
decision also states that grid emission factor calculations in LDCs should be more flexible3 and 
that suppressed demand will be taken into account in baselines2 (UNFCCC, 2009). But overall, 
incentives for projects in LDCs remain limited. 
 
3.2. In the EU climate and energy package 
In the European Climate and Energy Package for 2013-2020, the EU has committed itself to 
reducing its overall emissions to at least 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, and to 30% below 
1990 if a new global climate change agreement with comparable efforts by other developed 
countries is reached. It imposes new limits on the amount of CERs from CDM projects and 
ERUs from JI projects that will be allowed to be imported into the EU between 2008 and 
2020, both for the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and for the sectors not covered in 
it (non-trading sectors). Assuming that the EU ETS credit imports would be distributed 
linearly along all years in the period 2008-2020, Table 1 summarises the potential CDM/JI 
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credit demand from the EU for the period 2013-2020, with and without international 
agreement.  
 
Table 1 approximately here 
 
The package includes a provision with high relevance for LDCs. For the non-trading sectors, 
the limit for credit imports under the 20% reduction scenario has been generally set at 3% of 
their emissions in 2005. Twelve countries4 are allowed to import up to 4% of their 2005 
emissions. The extra 1% granted to these countries – around 80 million CERs - can be 
imported only from LDCs or Small Island Developing States (SIDSs). 
There are some additional conditions for the acceptance of CERs or ERUs in the European 
system. While the restrictions on approved project types sought by the Commission (on the 
basis of a consideration of “high quality projects”) were not approved, forestry credits will still 
be banned from the EU ETS, but are accepted for the non-trading sectors. Additionally, if no 
new climate agreement is reached, only the following CERs or ERUs will be accepted: 
- Credits issued during 2008-2012 
- Credits from projects registered before 2013, but issued later 
- CERs from projects registered after 2012 in LDCs 
- Credits from projects in countries where a bilateral agreement has been reached with 
this aim. 
In the case that a new international climate agreement is reached, only credits from countries 
that have ratified this agreement will be accepted from 2013. 
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Further qualitative criteria restricting the acceptance of credits in the EU system from 2013 
onwards are still possible. The qualitative criteria discussed so far include accepting only 
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects, or only “high quality” projects. While it has 
been speculated that “high quality” could mean credits that are not based on reductions of 
industrial gases (this is even more likely now after the recent debates on industrial gas 
projects, see endnote 5), or credits that are based on projects with a clear sustainable 
development component, and/or credits with stronger additionality substantiation, this term 
was never clearly defined officially. 
Since the Copenhagen Accord did not yield any new legally binding emission reduction 
targets for industrialised countries after 2012, so far, the EU climate package is currently the 
only legally-defined market for CDM projects after 2012. This is why this single policy is, 
currently, so important for the future of the CDM.  
Some questions remain as to the extent to which these measures can boost CDM 
development in LDCs: Are other Annex I countries going to match this EU initiative, and to 
what extent? Will the financial and technical barriers for CDM development in LDCs be 
overcome through these measures? And even if they are, will LDCs be able to match this 
demand with an adequate supply? 
In the following section, in order to try to answer these questions, we present a few possible 
post-2012 climate policy and carbon demand scenarios, which will be matched with our 
estimations of carbon credit supply from CDM projects. 
 
4. Post-2012 climate policy and market demand-supply scenarios  
In order to assess the effect of possible preferential access for LDCs and other policy 
scenarios for the future CDM, we create carbon credit demand and supply scenarios with and 
without an international agreement for the period 2013-2020.  
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4.1. Demand scenarios 
For the demand scenario with no international agreement, we take the announced 20% 
reduction for the EU, and the greenhouse gas reduction targets announced by other Annex I 
governments till mid-2009, which are not contingent on an international agreement. For the 
scenario with an international agreement, we take the 30% target for the EU and tighter 
targets for other Annex I governments, which we expect could be agreed during the coming 
negotiations. We build three demand scenarios, as described in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 approximately here 
 
To project the baseline emissions we use figures from the EU climate package described 
above; European Environmental Agency (EEA) projections for non-EU European countries 
(EEA, 2005); energy-related CO2 emissions from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
of the US Department of Energy and extrapolations of UNFCCC inventories for forestry and 
non-CO2 emissions for the USA, Canada and Russia (EIA, 2008a; EIA, 2008b; UNFCCC, 
2008); projections from the Australian Government (2008) for Australia; and extrapolations of 
UNFCCC emissions inventories for the years 2000-2005 for other countries (UNFCCC, 2008).  
In the EU-27 case, we assume that CERs are required to be supplementary to domestic 
emissions reductions, as this group has already announced that only 50% of the effort may 
be covered by emissions credits. For the other countries, we assume that a range between 
50% and 100% of the required reductions could be covered through the CDM. We choose, 
where available (Australia and other European countries), the low emissions path projections, 
which also account for some domestic mitigation action. 
The resulting demand scenarios are shown in Figures 2-4. 
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Figures 2-4 approximately here 
 
4.2. Supply scenarios 
How will CDM project submission develop in the future? As in the past, the start-up of new 
project types such as supercritical coal power plants, carbon capture and storage (CCS) and 
forestry could lead to rapid changes in the composition of the inflow. Moreover, the 
interpretation of additionality by the EB and changes in baseline methodologies can have 
sudden and massive impacts. Supply would decrease if a project category is suddenly 
deemed non-additional as happened with cement blending.  
Another key influence is the development of post-2012 negotiations, including present Annex 
B countries pressing for increased mitigation actions by developing countries, and, as outlined 
above, possible limitations on the import of CERs on the basis of “quality” considerations.  
Due to these manifold influences, it is extremely difficult to forecast future CER volumes. 
Besides the inflow of new project types and projects of types that are already in the CDM 
pipeline, the key parameters influencing supply are the delay of project implementation, non-
validation rate of submitted projects, the rejection rate of validated projects and the 
performance rate of registered projects. We therefore derive our supply scenarios based on 
the projected 2020 CERs from UNEP Risoe Centre’s CDM Pipeline as of end of 2008 (UNEP 
Risoe Centre, 2009), modified in order to account for these parameters. None of the following 
estimations include the potential supply from Programmes of Activities, since so far there are 
just five PoAs registered, making projections very uncertain. It should be noted that the 
resulting projections are based only on extrapolation of the observed amount of projects that 
have been submitted for validation and registration, accounting for observed trends of 
submissions and approval rates over time. No economic modelling or equilibrium analysis has 
been used in deriving the scenarios. Thus, the only way in which we make the demand 
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influence our supply estimations is when we assume some policy-related restrictions to the 
acceptability of CDM projects.  
We use the following formulae to project CER supply volumes: 
(1): CERs projected up to 2020 from CDM projects registered until 2012: 
 
Where: 
CERsubm = CER volume by 2020 listed in PDDs of projects submitted up to 2008 
CERinfl,y = CER volume by 2020 listed in PDDs of projects to be submitted in each year 
between 2008 and 2012  
pvalid = probability of validation of projects submitted until 2012 
prej = probability of rejection of validated projects by the CDM EB 
CERreg = CER volume by 2020 listed in PDDs of currently registered projects 
pperf = CER issuance rate in % of CERreg 
We do not include possible delays in this formula because, for projects with a 10-year 
crediting period starting before 2010, any delay will not change overall CER volumes. Delay 
only matters for renewed projects with 7-year crediting periods.  
(2): CERs projected up to 2020 from projects registered between 2013 and 2020: 
 
Where: 
CERinfl,y = CER volume by 2020 listed in PDDs of projects to be submitted in each year 
between 2013 and 2020 
perfregrejvalidylsubmsum pCERppCERCERCER ∗+−∗+= ∑ ))1()(( 2012
2008
,inf2020





ddelay, y = percentage of pre-2021 CERs remaining due to delay of project implementation, for 
each year, calculated according to equation (3) 
pvalid = probability of validation of projects submitted 
prej = probability of rejection of validated projects by the CDM EB 
pperf = CER issuance rate in % of CERreg 
The data for CERsubm, CERinfl,y and CERreg. have been obtained from the UNEP Risoe Pipeline 
(2009), and result from the projections by the project developers of how many emission 
reduction credits they expect to obtain until the year 2020. The figures for CERinfl,y have been 
adjusted to account for the shorter crediting period up to 2020 that projects being submitted 
in the future will have. For the probability of validation of projects we assume, for a business-
as-usual case, 70%. Rejection rates have increased over time, from less than 2% in 2005 to 
10% in 2007 and early 2008 (UNEP Risoe Centre, 2009). We thus take 10% as input for our 
business-as-usual projection of CDM supply in 2013-2020. Average CER issuance 
performance is set at 98% of predicted CER generation as achieved in the past. We use this 
figure for the CER issuance rate in the business-as-usual case. However, issuance 
performance varies greatly across project types, so that the median performance is only 
82%. We use this median for modelling stricter CDM supply scenarios. 
Delays in project development lead to loss of CERs before a certain date (2012 or 2020), 
even if not all of them lead to an overall loss of CERs if the CDM continues afterwards6. The 
effect of this delay on estimated CER volumes depends on a specific project’s remaining 
crediting period and would thus theoretically have to be summed up case by case. This also 
applies to those registered projects whose crediting period only starts in the future. 
Therefore, the impact of delays depends on the shape of the CER inflow over time. Assuming 
that the crediting period of all projects coming in during a year would on average begin in the 
middle of this year, the discount of CERs due to delay can be quantified in the following 
functional form: 
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(3): Project delay function: 
ddelay,year = durationpre−2021− delaydurationpre−2021  
Where: 
ddelay,year = share of pre-2021 CERs in terms of projected CER level for projects submitted 
during this year remaining due to delay of project implementation 
durationpre-2021 = number of months between July of year until end of December 2020 
delay = delay of project implementation (months) 
We assume, for all projects, that the delay in project implementation averages 6 months. 
Using the formulas and parameters described above, we generate seven CER supply 
scenarios for the period 2013-2020. In a very strict scenario (Scenario A), only the credits 
generated from projects registered up to 2012 would be accepted in the global carbon 
market. In a status quo scenario (B), the CDM would continue with the same rules, 
stringency, range of host countries and project types as today, continuing to increase credit 
supply beyond 2012. Following a “high quality CERs” demand policy by the EU, Annex I 
countries could agree to no longer accept credits from industrial gas projects (Scenario C). 
Annex I countries could agree to only accept CERs from LDCs for projects registered after 
2012 (Scenario D). Additional measures to create appropriate incentives that promote CDM 
development in LDCs, added to the rule depicted in Scenario D, would form an active LDC-
promotion scenario (Scenario D2). Stronger pressure by developing countries to accept REDD 
(reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation) and CCS projects and clarify rules 
for programmatic CDM could lead to a larger CDM supply (Scenario E). Finally, a stricter “high 
quality” scenario would allow CERs from post-2012 projects with stricter additionality 
considerations and again without industrial gas projects (Scenario F).  
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Table 3 provides an overview of these scenarios, their assumptions and calculations. In all 
cases, we deduct the CER demand projected for 2008-2012, which we have previously 
estimated will total 3300 MtCO2eq (Michaelowa, 2008), from the overall CER supply for 2008-
2020. Based on the current geographical distribution of CDM projects, we estimate supply 
from the following five regions: LDCs, Latin America, Europe and Middle East, Asia-Pacific 
other, and Africa other. For scenario D2, to account for the extra inflow of CDM projects from 
LDCs resulting from active CDM promotion in these countries, we take 50% of the theoretical 
potential estimated by a World Bank Study for LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa (De Gouvello et 
al., 2008) and add it to the CERs projected from the CDM pipeline. The results of our 
projections are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 3 approximately here 
Table 4 approximately here 
 
5. Estimating quantitative impact of scenarios on CER demand from 
LDCs 
5.1. Supply-demand balance 
The combination of our CER supply and demand scenarios is shown in Table 5. In this 
analysis we have disregarded the potential supply from JI projects. We do this because this 
instrument suffers from delays in host country approval, and because it also constitutes 
mitigation effort in Annex I countries.  
 
Table 5 approximately here 
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These figures show that the balance between supply and demand of CERs depends largely on 
whether there is an international agreement (resulting in larger demand) and on whether the 
CER contribution to abatement in Annex I countries is capped or not (supplementarity). 
Without an agreement and with a cap to the use of CERs of 50% of the mitigation effort in all 
Annex I countries, CER oversupply is very likely. With an agreement, it is very likely that the 
CDM would not provide sufficient credits to cover the potential demand during 2013-2020, 
even with 50% supplementarity. The scenario with the financial crisis – which also assumes 
an international agreement is reached –has similar results to the scenario with agreement. 
It should be noted that several of these combinations are unlikely. Under a scenario with no 
agreement, for example, it is unlikely that the CDM will be significantly enlarged, as Annex I 
countries will not be willing to finance further projects in developing countries. It is also 
unlikely that having not reached an agreement on climate change mitigation, all Annex I 
countries would then agree to only accept high quality CERs. However, some parties or 
groups (such as the EU) could decide to implement these limitations unilaterally. Thus, while 
not completely realistic, the combination of scenarios shows an overall picture of the range of 
possible balances in the future carbon credit market from the most optimistic to the most 
pessimistic possibilities.  
Figure 5 illustrates how the supply would be spread across regions and shows that under 
most scenarios, LDCs remain unimportant in the market.  
 
Figure 5 approximately here 
 
We expected that the scenarios without industrial gases, with strict rules, or with CERs only 
from LDCs after 2012 would have an impact on supply from LDCs. However, industrial gases 
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are decreasing in the CDM pipeline, falling from close to half in 2004-2005 to just 4% of the 
new CER supply in 2008. Our projections for 2013-2020 reflect these trends and the fact that 
the current CDM rules do not allow new installations with industrial gas emissions to host 
CDM projects. Only if this rule is relaxed, the supply of CERs from industrial gas reduction 
projects would very likely increase again (see endnote 5). The scenario with strict rules is 
similar. Finally, the scenario with preferential access and incentives that promote CDM 
development in LDCs after 2012 does show some improvement for these countries, but the 
supply from all other countries up to 2012 is still much larger. We should also remember that 
this supply from LDCs will only materialise if the existing barriers for CDM project 
implementation in these countries are overcome, as seen when comparing scenarios D and 
D2. The promotion of PoAs with high sustainability impacts could provide an opportunity for 
this. This promotion could be done through the provision of technical support for coordination 
entities that set up such programmes, and through the financing of their upfront costs (PDD 
development, methodology development, registration and validation, and coordination of first 
participating project activities). 
 
5.2. Potential sustainable development benefits from CDM projects and PoAs in LDCs 
If we apply Olsen and Fenhann’s (2008) SD taxonomy to the CDM project types most 
frequently seen in LDCs, we see that these projects potentially have relatively high SD 
contributions: four of the five most frequent project types have on average 3 to 3.5 clearly 
identified SD benefits per project; with only biomass energy projects having less than 3 SD 
benefits per project7. While the benefits from hydro and biomass projects are distributed in 
the social and economic areas, those from reforestation stem mostly from the environmental 
area, and those from biogas and landfill gas projects come mostly from both environmental 
and social improvements (see Figure 6).  
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Figure 6 approximately here 
 
The project types used in PoAs are mainly very small, dispersed technologies, as foreseen by 
the regulators. Agricultural waste and household energy efficiency projects (compact 
fluorescent lamps and stoves) dominate, followed by solar water heaters and photovoltaics 
which according to Olsen and Fenhann 2008) are among the CDM project types with the 
highest SD benefit potential (see Figure 7). Most PoAs (88%) are small-scale. Most 
technologies are likely to have substantial social benefits.  
 
Figure 7 approximately here 
 
Generally, PoAs have a high “leverage”, i.e. if they are successful, they can expand quickly 
without any further delays in the CDM project cycle. For example, an Indian PoA aims at 
distributing 400 million compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs). However, drawing on our 
knowledge of CFL projects, we estimate the total volume of lamps distributed by the end of 
2012 by the three PoAs in the pipeline at 90 million. For stove PoAs, the total volume could 
reach 3.5 million stoves by that time. 1.7 million domestic biogas plants and 1350 swine farm 
digesters could become operational before 2013, which would be in the same order of 
magnitude as the most successful development assistance projects covering these 
technologies.  
While PoAs still have to show that they actually generate the large reductions they foresee, 
they could allow LDCs to harness an eventual preferential access to the CDM market. A clear 
indicator is that some private sector companies like JP Morgan and C Quest Capital are 
entering the PoA market in countries that would never be appealing for such companies in a 
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“normal” business context. Thus, eventually, the development target of the CDM and the aim 
to generate cheap CERs could be reconciled. 
 
6. Discussion of preferential access options 
In the world trade system, there is a case that could be used to illustrate the effect of 
preferential access options for a specific group of countries. The Lomé Convention, first 
signed in 1975 and renewed three times afterwards, is a trade and aid agreement between 
the European Community (EC) and 71 so-called ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) 
countries. It establishes the basis for trade and development cooperation between these two 
groups of countries, motivated both by Europe’s interest in guaranteeing the supply of raw 
materials, and by their wish to support ACP countries’ sustained development. The Lomé 
agreements set preferential access quotas for agreed agricultural products that could then 
enter the EC market free of duty. While these agreements are no longer in place due to their 
incompatibility with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, they are still an interesting case 
study for illustrating the limitations of preferential access policies.  
According to Cosgrove (1994), ACP exports to Europe accounted for 3.4% of total EC imports 
in 1975, when the first Lomé Convention was signed. Due to the large growth in EC trade, 
ACP exports declined to 1.5% of EC imports in 1992. While ACP exports to the EC did grow, 
they could not keep pace with the growth in the European market. Cosgrove concludes that 
the Lomé Convention did not provide sufficient support to enable ACP countries to keep their 
market share, and that it therefore failed in its goals.  
The preferences generated by Lomé for ACP exports were highly dependent on the barriers 
that the EC placed for trade in general. For agricultural products, the general rule is that the 
more processed the product is, the more barriers it faces. Thus, ACP countries would have 
benefited most from adding value to their raw materials and exporting them to Europe in 
processed form. Trade also depends on the current prices of commodities. During the 1980s 
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and 90s, the prices of agricultural products mainly fell, which also had a negative impact on 
ACP trade. Finally, the increase in trade from the preferred country group also depends on 
the elasticity of demand for the product. The elasticity of demand for most ACP products in 
Europe is low, meaning that a lower price for them (offered by ACP countries) has little effect 
on their export volume (Cosgrove, 1994).  
Some non-traditional products have been identified as benefiting from the Lomé Convention, 
among them canned tuna, leather and leather products, fresh flowers, some vegetables, 
textiles and garments. Many of these products were subject to levies from the European 
common agricultural policy (CAP), and thus profited from a comparative advantage under 
Lomé. In Mauritius, the strong specialization in sugar exports to the EC enabled the 
accumulation of funds that were used to shift the economy towards the textile industry, 
tourism and financial services (Laaksonen et al., 2007). Despite these successes, the main 
barriers inhibiting ACP export performance could not be overcome by a trade agreement: 
climatic conditions (droughts and desertification), crop and livestock diseases, lack of 
infrastructure leading to high transportation and communication costs, oil price increases, and 
AIDS continued to restrict the development and integration of ACP countries in the world 
market (Cosgrove, 1994).  
The Lomé experience provides lessons for the climate regime. Through Lomé, not just access 
to a market was secured, but that access came with fewer costs (no tariffs or levies). In the 
climate regime, CDM projects from LDC countries benefit from a zero registration fee. 
However, registration is only a small fraction of CDM transaction costs, whose bulk 
encompasses PDD development, methodology development (if needed) and validation. 
Providing upfront financing for PDD development and validation in countries with little CDM 
development has been agreed on, but funds are limited. If similar financing, for example, for 
the coordination of PoAs with high SD benefits could be provided, not only could the CDM 
potential of LDCs be realised, but also a better contribution to local development could be 
made. It would be important, however, to keep these incentives targeted specifically at LDCs. 
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In the EU climate package, some degree of preferential access for CDM projects from LDCs 
has been secured, but no provisions are yet in place for further supporting the 
implementation of these projects. As seen in the Lomé experience, the underlying causes of 
poor countries’ lack of competitiveness need to be addressed.  
Furthermore, in Lomé, success was observed for special types of products with added value. 
A parallel could be made here to CDM project types with added value (sustainable 
development benefits or stricter additionality, for example), but only if this added value is 
transformed into some kind of financial incentive that supports these projects. This kind of 
differentiation between project types is not yet in place in the climate regime. PoAs could 
constitute an opportunity in this context. These programmes seem to have a stronger focus 
on small-scale projects with higher SD benefits than individual CDM projects, and so far 
represent a higher share in LDCs. Thus, special quotas or special treatment for PoAs could be 
an opportunity to introduce such a differentiation, without explicitly differentiating between 
project types or host countries.  
A further issue is the source of financing for such preferences. In the Lomé conventions, the 
EU was a relatively homogeneous group of countries that could agree on securing financing 
for the trade and aid components of the agreements.  In the climate regime, while the 
Copenhagen Accord led to a generic pledge by industrialised countries to finance mitigation 
and adaptation in developing countries, the modalities for this finance are still unclear (see 
Roberts et al., 2010 for a discussion on open questions about the finance promise, and WRI, 
2010 for a summary of the financial pledges with comments on whether they are new and 
additional). 
The discussion of compatibility with the international trade regime is a final lesson that can 
be learned from the Lomé experience. While it is not clear whether the CERs deriving from 
CDM projects can be considered as “goods” or “services” that are regulated under the WTO, 
analysts suggests that, in this case, preferential treatment towards CERs from specific origin 
could be deemed non-WTO conform. Thus, authors discussing the interface between the 
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Kyoto Protocol and the WTO suggest that caution should be taken to avoid potential disputes 
between both regimes – for instance through clear definition of the nature of emission 
reduction credits (for detailed discussions see Kim, 2000; Wiser, 2000; and, more recently, 
Howse and Eliason, 2009). 
 
7. Conclusions 
The current and potential supply of CDM projects from Least Developed Countries is low as 
many barriers prevent their participation in the carbon market. However, the case of 
Honduras shows that with limited international financial sources, local entrepreneurship and 
leadership can bring successes in the CDM when coupled with external aid to set up 
appropriate institutions. LDCs have a much higher share in CDM Programmes of Activities 
(PoAs)  than in individual CDM projects. According to a taxonomy of SD contributions from 
CDM projects that includes social, environmental, economic and other benefits, the project 
types dominating in LDCs and especially the PoAs yield potentially high SD benefits. 
Both in the international climate negotiations and by the EU, options have been proposed for 
fostering CDM development in LDCs. While the financial incentives agreed internationally are 
available for all countries hosting less than 10 CDM projects, preferential access to part of the 
European carbon market is granted to CERs from LDCs through the new EU climate and 
energy package.  
By projecting possible CER supply and demand scenarios for the period 2013-2020, we find 
that the supply-demand balance largely depends on the level of ambition of Annex I 
countries’ targets and on the degree of supplementarity on the use of CERs for meeting 
them. A restriction on the supply of CERs from CDM projects registered after 2012 to just 
LDCs would not have an important impact if the existing barriers for project implementation 
in these countries are not overcome and the current trends in project submission from these 
countries are maintained. Other likely limitations in CER supply on the basis of project quality 
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would have an even smaller effect on CDM project distribution across host countries. Given 
the little abatement potential available in LDCs this is not surprising, and raises questions on 
the appropriateness of offsetts for fostering mitigation in less developed countries. Perhaps 
other approaches, such as Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, which would be financed 
through international cooperation, are more promising.  
Drawing a comparison between preferential access agreements in the agricultural trade 
system (Lomé Conventions) and the climate regime, we find further evidence that not just 
preferential access is important, but also reduced access costs. The current registration fee 
exemption for LDCs represents only a small fraction of CDM transaction costs and is probably 
not enough. The now agreed loan for PDD development and validation of CDM projects will 
be applicable to all countries with less than 10 CDM projects, diluting the benefit for LDCs. An 
opportunity could arise if similar financing could be provided for PoAs, which have a much 
higher share in LDCs. Furthermore, the limited impact of the Lomé agreements on ACP trade 
was partly due to the fact that the underlying causes of lack of competitiveness were not 
addressed. In the climate regime, if CDM implementation barriers are not directly addressed, 
the CDM might remain a dream for poor countries. Increased incentives for products with 
added value led to the few success stories in the Lomé framework. For the climate regime, 
this could be translated into added financial incentives for CDM projects with added value – 
however this may be interpreted. Again, PoAs could constitute an opportunity here, as they 
so far seem to focus on project types with higher SD benefits. Finally, financing was identified 
as a critical issue for undertaking these measures: if financial incentives for special projects or 
specific regions are to be created, clear rules for their provision and distribution will need to 




1: Programmes of Activities are a modality of CDM projects, which allows for bundling 
similar activities taking place in different locations into one single project. Their aim is to 
simplify access to the CDM to emission reduction activities that are dispersed in nature 
and can begin in different points in time, such as the distribution of efficient cooking 
stoves, or the installation of micro hydro power stations.  
2. Poverty or lack of infrastructure reduces the demand for energy services in poor 
countries: energy use would be higher if people could afford it or the infrastructure was 
in place. Depending on whether this suppressed demand is taken into account or not, 
baselines for CDM projects may change significantly (for a discussion of the issue see 
Winkler and Thorne, 2002). 
3: Grid emission factors are used in the CDM to estimate the GHG emissions from the 
production of electricity in each land or region, in order to calculate how much 
abatement a project in the electricity sector generates. The calculation of grid emission 
factors requires data from all installations producing electricity in the respective land or 
region, which poses a barrier especially in LDCs.  
4: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. 
5: These projects reduce the emission of gases with very high global warming potential 
from industrial facilities – notably the emissions of HFC-23 from the production of 
refrigerants. Despite the clear additionality of these projects (in the absence of related 
legislation, there is no incentive other than the CDM revenue to implement the projects), 
they have been criticised because the CDM revenue largely exceeds the cost of reducing 
the emissions and can even exceed the value of the refrigerant production (Wara, 2006). 
The CDM may thus provide the perverse incentive of increasing production in order to 
receive more revenues. In the last few months, new criticism has arisen due to apparent 
flaws in the baseline methodology for these projects, which would allow such perverse 
incentives to subsist (CDM Methodologies Panel, 2010; Schneider et al., 2010).  
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6: If a project suffers a delay in its registration when its operations have already started, it 
will lose the CERs for the emission reductions achieved before the date of registration. 
As project developers can change the start date of a project’s crediting period once after 
registration by simple communication to the CDM Executive Board, a delay of 
implementation for an already registered project does not lead to an overall loss of CERs 
during the crediting period, but to a loss compared to the quantity estimated to accrue 
by a specific date. 
7: As a comparison, among the projects analysed by Olsen and Fenhann (2008), N2O 
projects have the least SD benefits (one benefit/project on average), and energy 
distribution projects have the most (5.5 benefits/project), followed by energy efficiency 
in households (4 benefits/project). 
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Tables: 
Table 1: Potential credit demand from the EU for the period 2013-2020 
Source 20% reduction (Mt CO2eq) 
30% reduction (with international 
agreement) (Mt CO2eq) 
EU ETS 954 1824 
Non-trading sectors 750 1300 




Table 2: Carbon credit demand scenarios 2013-2020: 
assumed emission reduction targets 
Country / Group 
Scenario 1:  
No agreement 
Scenario 2: International 
agreement 
Scenario 3:  
Financial crisis 
EU-27 20% below 1990, credit import up 
to 50% of reduction effort 
30% below 1990, credit import up 
to 50% of reduction effort 
Same as in 
Scenario 2, but 
baseline 
emissions during 
first two years 
are 3% less than 
in the base case 
US Back to 1990 emission levels 10% below 1990 levels 
Canada Back to 1990 emission levels 10% below 1990 levels 
Japan 10% below 1990 levels 20% below 1990 levels 
Australia 5% below 2000 levels 15% below 2000 levels 
Russia 20% below 1990 levels 30% below 1990 levels 
Belarus and 
Ukraine 
20% below 1990 levels 30% below 1990 levels 
Other Annex I 20% below 1990 levels (including 
Turkey with 5% below 2012 
levels) 
30% below 1990 levels (including 
Turkey with 10% below 2012 
levels) 
Note: During the Copenhagen meeting and in the Copenhagen Accords, some of these 
pledges were restructured or strengthened. However, the new pledges are non-binding and 
most of them are also conditional on, for example, a legally-binding agreement. Thus, the 
reduction levels we assume here are still realistic. 
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Table 3: CER supply scenarios 2013-2020: assumptions 
Scenario Description Values for parameters 
A 
Only CERs up to 
2012 
Only CERs generated from 
projects registered up to 
2012 are considered for 
supply up to 2020 
pvalid = 70% 
prej   = 10% 
pperf = 98% 
supply = CERsum2020 – demand2008-12  
B 
CDM same 
CDM continues with same 
rules, same stringency and 
same countries 
pvalid = 70% 
prej   = 10% 
pperf = 98%  
supply = CERsum2020 + CERadd2020 – demand2008-12  
C 
No new industrial 
gases 
CDM continues with same 
stringency and countries 
after 2012, but without 
industrial gas projects 
pvalid = 70% 
prej   = 10% 
pperf = 98%  
supply = CERsum2020 + CERadd2020 (w/o ind gases) – demand2008-12   
D 
After 2012 only 
LDCs 
For projects registered after 
2012, only CERs from 
LDCs are accepted 
pvalid = 70% 
prej   = 10% 
pperf = 98%  
supply = CERsum2020 + CERadd2020 (only LDCs) – demand2008-12  
D2 
After 2012 only 
LDCs with active 
promotion 
For projects registered after 
2012, only CERs from 
LDCs are accepted. 
Measures to incentivise this 
supply are in place 
pvalid = 70% 
prej   =   10% 
pperf = 98%  




CER generation between 
2013 and 2020 with 50% 
higher potential each year 
pvalid = 70% 
prej   = 10% 
pperf = 98% 
CERinfl is multiplied by 150%  
supply = CERsum2020 + CERadd2020 – demand2008-12   
F 
CDM strict rules 
From 2013 onwards stricter 
additionality, no industrial 
gases: less validations, 
more rejections, smaller 
CER issuance rate 
Up to 2012:   After 2012: 
pvalid = 70%   pvalid = 50% 
prej   = 10%   prej   = 15% 
pperf = 98%   pperf = 82% 




Table 4: Carbon credit supply scenarios 2013-2020: 
Projected supply from CDM projects (MtCO2eq) 
Scenario / Region 
A B C D D2 E F 
Only CERS 















Africa other 132 171 189 132 132 190 164 
Asia-Pacific other 5108 6884 6808 5108 5108 7773 6060 
Europe and Middle East 25 35 38 25 25 40 32 
Latin America 780 1026 1007 780 780 1150 907 
LDCs 55 73 93 73 662 82 76 
Total supply 2012-2020 




Table 5: CER supply-demand balance for 2013-2020 (MtCO2eq) 
Scenario 





A Only CERs up to 2012 -2699 – 1107 2461 – 8112 2035 – 7347 
B CDM same -4822 – -1016 337 – 5989 -89 – 5223 
C No new industrial gases -4758 – -952 402 – 6053 -24 – 5287 
D Only LDCs after 2012 -2717 – 1089 2443 – 8094 2017 – 7328 
D2 Only LDCs after 2012, with promotion -3306 – 500 1854 – 7505 1428 – 6739 
E CDM enlarged -5884 – -2078 -725 – 4927 -1150 – 4161 
F CDM strict rules -3852 – -46 1307 – 6959 881 – 6193 
Note: The ranges indicate the different supplementarity assumptions, from 50% 
supplementarity, to freedom to use the CDM for offsetting as much as desired. Negative 
figures indicate excessive CER supply.  
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Figures: 





















< 5000 CERs p.a. 5 - 10,000 CERs p.a.
 




























Note: The main bars indicate demand when countries are only allowed to cover up to 50% of 
their emission reductions through the use of CDM credits; the error bars show demand when 





























Note: The main bars indicate demand when countries are only allowed to cover up to 50% of 
their emission reductions through the use of CDM credits; the error bars show demand when 


























Note: The main bars indicate demand when countries are only allowed to cover up to 50% of 
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Note: For the demand, the main columns indicate the situation when countries are only 
allowed to cover up to 50% of their emission reductions through CDM credits; the error bars 
show demand when there is freedom to use the CDM for offsetting as much as desired. 
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Note: Figures in parentheses show the number of such projects in the CDM pipeline of LDCs 
as of October 2010. Afforestation and energy efficiency of own generation projects are not 
included, as these project types were not evaluated in Olsen and Fenhann (2008). 


























































Share in PoAs Share in active CDM projects
 
Note: ENEF = energy efficiency; T&D = transmission and distribution. 
Source: UNEP Risoe Center, 2010. 
 
 
